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Abstract: We present a procedure for deciding security of protocols employing the Ex-
clusive or operator. This procedure relies on a direct combination of a constraint solver for
security protocol with a unification algorithm for the exclusive-or theory. Hence compared
to the previous ones it is much simpler and easily amenable to automation. The principle
of the approach can be applied to other theories too.
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Une procédure de décision simple pour la résolution de
contraintes avec ou-exclusif†
Résumé : Nous présentons une procédure permettant de décider la sécurité de protocoles
cryptographiques dans le cadre d’un nombre borné d’acteurs en présence du ou-exclusif.
Cette procédure est basé sur des techniques de combinaison d’algorithmes d’unifications.
Par rapport aux travaux précédents, elle a une présentation beaucoup plus simple et est
implantable efficacement. L’approche développée se généralise aux cas d’autres théories.
Mots-clés : Protocoles de sécurité, procédure de décision, unification, réécriture, ou-
exclusif.
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1 Introduction
Security protocol analysis has been intensively studied [23, 25, 29, 15, 20, 19] motivated by
the threats on internet communications and their dramatic consequences. Recently many
procedures have been proposed to decide insecurity of cryptographic protocols in the Dolev-
Yao model w.r.t. a finite number of protocol sessions [1, 5, 17, 28, 24, 2]. Among the
different approaches the symbolic ones [24, 11, 27, 4, 21] are based on reducing the problem
to constraint solving in a term algebra. Constraint solving has proved to be quite effective
on standard benchmarks [13] and also was able to discover new flaws on several protocols
[12].
However while most formal analysis of security protocols abstracts from low-level prop-
erties, i.e., certain algebraic properties of encryption, such as the multiplicativity of RSA
or the properties induced by chaining methods for block ciphers, many real attacks and
protocol weaknesses rely on these properties. In particular for the XOR operator (which is
frequently used in protocol design) Ryan and Schneider [30] give a simple attack on Bull’s
recursive authentication protocol: the protocol is used to distribute a connected chain of
keys linking all the nodes from originator to the server, but if one key is compromised the
others can be compromised too thanks to the property of XOR. Conversely, if XOR is
considered as a free operator then, as shown by L. Paulson using the Isabelle prover [26],
the protocol is secure. For attacks exploiting the XOR properties in the context of mobile
communications see [7].
Therefore several attempts have been made to extend the protocol decision procedures to
incorporate algebraic properties in the Dolev-Yao model and relax in that way the so-called
perfect encryption assumption (i.e. One needs a decryption key to extract the plaintext from
the ciphertext, and also, a ciphertext can be generated only with the appropriate key and
message). To our knowledge only two such procedures have been proposed for handling the
properties of the XOR operator: [9] gives a decision procedure for XOR with an optimal
NP complexity and [14] describes a constraint solving procedure for a more general class of
protocols but with a higher complexity. Both procedures seem difficult to be turned into
effective verification tools. The former is based on guessing terms of some height and may
lead to combinatorial explosion. The latter has also hard complexity and is intricate.
In this paper we present a new procedure for deciding security of protocols employing
the XOR operator. This procedure relies on a direct combination of a constraint solver for
security protocol with a unification algorithm for the XOR theory. Hence compared to the
previous ones it is much simpler and easily amenable to automation. The principle of the
approach can be applied to other theories too. An advantage of our approach is that it reuses
as much as possible results from unification theory and especially combination techniques,
instead of reconstructing them in ad-hoc way for security constraints.
Structure of the paper. In the following section, we provide an example illustrating the
role of XOR in attacks. We then present the theoretical framework of our study, and our
model of protocols (in Section 4) and of the hostile environment in Section 5. After this,
we define the Simultaneous Construction Problems, and the translation from protocols to
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SCPs in Section 6, and transformations on SCPs in Sections 7 and 8. We give an example
demonstrating how this system permits to automatically find an attack on a protocol in
Section 9, and prove its termination in Section 10 and its completeness in Section 11. Finally,
we deduce from a decision procedure for protocol insecurity in presence of xor in the case
of a finite number of session in Section 12.
2 Related work
The main result presented in this article is the decidability of the search for attacks on a
protocol within a finite number of sessions and no bounds on message length. This result is
very similar to the one presented by V. Shmatikov and H. Comon-Lundh in [14], the main
difference being that the protocol we consider are only a subset of the protocol they take
into account. The reason for this is that we impose some conditions on the occurrences of
the variables in the rules of the protocol. However, these conditions are no real restrictions
in practice.
To explain why, let us consider the reception of a message m (a ground term) by an
agent. Upon receiving this message, the agent matches it with a pattern t, and assigns
values to the variables of t according to the result of this matching. We define a protocol
to be deterministic when given m and t, there is at most one possible assignement, i.e. at
most one substitution τ such that tτ ≡ m. As is noted in [31], not every deterministic
protocol satisfies our restrictions. However, as was already noted in [9], and proven in [8]
every deterministic protocol can be effectively transformed in a protocol that satisfies these
restrictions. We have not considered this larger class of deterministic protocols in order
to avoid the introduction of an additionnal ordering on the variables as is done in [1], this
additionnal ordering being encoded within the order on messages.
To sum up, we consider the result presented in this article is equivalent for practical
purposes to the one presented in [14]. But we claim that this article is very original because
the algorithm presented and the proof of it are very different. In [14], but also in all
recent papers considering the problem of cryptographic protocols analysis in presence of an
algebraic operators [9, 10, 31, 6], the equalities induced by the theory of the operator are
hard-wired into the deduction system and into the proof. The proofs are technically involved
when only one algebraic operator is considered, and we do not know any attempt to consider
several independant algebraic operators at the same time.
On the other hand, it can be shown that the system presented in this article terminates,
is sound and is complete as soon as the theory has some simple properties. We plan to write
soon an extension of the result presented to take into account several algebraic operators.
3 A Motivating Example
We illustrate that when taking the algebraic properties of XOR into account, new attacks can
occur. As an example, we use a variant of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol [22], i.e.,
INRIA
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the public-key Needham-Schroeder Procotol with Lowe’s fix, where in some place, instead
of concatenation XOR is used. Using common notation, the protocol is given as follows:
1. A→ B : {NA, A}
p
KB
2. B → A : {NB ,⊕({NA, B})}
p
KA
3. A→ B : {NB}
p
KB
If XOR is interpreted as free symbol, such as pairing, then according to [22] this protocol is
secure. In particular, the intruder is not able to get hold of NB . However, if the algebraic
properties of XOR are taken into account, the following attack is possible, which is a variant
of the original attack on the Needham-Schroeder Protocol and which allows the intruder I
to obtain NB . In this attack, two sessions run interleaved where the steps of the second
session are marked with ′. In the first session, A talks to the intruder I , and in the second
session I , purporting to be A, talks to B. We emphasize that in this attack I generates new
messages by applying the XOR operator and uses that NA ⊕B ⊕ I ⊕B = NA ⊕ I .
1. A→ I : {NA, A}
p
KI
1’. I(A) → B : {⊕({NA, B, I}), A}
p
KB
2’. B → I(A) : {NB,⊕({NA, B, I, B})}
p
KA
2. I → A : {NB,⊕({NA, B, I, B})}
p
KA
3. A→ I : {NB}
p
KI
3’. I(A) → B : {NB}
p
KB
RR n
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4 Terms and Protocols
4.1 Messages and Knowledge
In this paper we assume the same setting as the one considered in [9]. The messages are
modelled by terms over a signature containing a denumerable number of free constants and:
F =
{
〈 , 〉 , { }p , −1, { }s , ⊕ , 0
}
The 〈 , 〉 represents the concatenation (pairing) of its two arguments.The constructor { }p
represents the public key encryption, and for a public key k ∈ Key, the term k−1 represents
the inverse key. The operator { }s represents the symmetric key encryption. We call Ff
the set of these operators. Under the hypothesis of non-collision between messages, the
operators in Ff are free: For f, g ∈ Ff , the equality f(t1, t2) = g(t′1, t
′
2) holds if, and only
if, f = g, t1 = t
′
1 and t2 = t
′
2.
On the other hand, the ⊕ operator represents the Exclusive-Or operation, and 0 is
the constant representing sequences of the 0 bit-value of any length. Given two arbitrary
messages a and b we consider that this operator has the following properties:
x⊕ (y ⊕ z) = (x⊕ y) ⊕ z (A)
x⊕ y = y ⊕ x (C)
x⊕ 0 = x (U)
x⊕ x = 0 (N)
If we orient from left to right the equations (U) and (N), we get a convergent rewrite system
modulo AC. Given a term t, we note ptq the normal form of t. For example, we have:
  p⊕({⊕({a, b}), b, c})q = ⊕({a, c})
  p⊕({a,⊕({b, c})})q = ⊕({a, b, c})
Given a term t, we define the factors of t, denoted Factor(t):
Factor(t) =
{
{t1, . . . , tn} if ptq = ⊕({t1, . . . , tn})
{t} otherwise
We note that all the factors of a normalized term ptq have a free root operator.
The subterms are defined on normalized terms. Given a term t such that t = ptq, the set
of its subterms Sub(t) is defined inductively by:
Sub(t) = {t} ∪



Sub(t1) ∪ Sub(t2) If t = f(t1, t2)
with f a free symbol
∪u∈Factor(t)Sub(u) Otherwise
Given a set of terms E, we also note Sub(E) the set ∪t∈ESub(t).
INRIA
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If the root operator of a normalized term t is a free constructor or a constant, we say t
is a free term. Otherwise, we say t is a ⊕ term.
Last, we call X the set of variables, and T(F ,X ) (resp. pT(F ,X )q) the set of terms
(resp. normalized terms). Substitutions, noted σ, τ , . . . are defined as mappings from X to
pT(F ,X )q. The application of a substitution σ on a term t, denoted tσ, consists in the term
where all variables x1, . . . , xn of t are replaced by the terms x1σ, . . . , xnσ.
4.2 Protocols
In order to decide the security of a protocol w.r.t secrecy or authentication for a fixed
number of protocol sessions can be reduced to deciding the security for a single session by
guessing an interleaving of the sessions that leads to the security violation [28]. In the same
way we can assume that the protocol steps are linearly ordered (otherwise we simply try all
possible orderings). Hence we will consider here only a single session of a protocol defined
as a sequence of steps.
The following definition is explained below.
Definition 1 A protocol rule is of the form R ⇒ S where R and S are terms.
A protocol P is a tuple ({Rι ⇒ Sι, ι ∈ I},S) where I is an initial segment of the set
of natural numbers, S is a finite set of normalized messages with 0 ∈ S, the initial intruder
knowledge and Rι ⇒ Sι, for every ι ∈ I, is a protocol rule such that
1. the terms Rι and Sι are normalized;
2. for all x ∈ Var(Sι), there exists ι′ ≤ ι such that x ∈ Var(Rι′);
3. for any subterm ⊕({t1, . . . , tn}) of Rι, there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Var(ti) ⊆
∪ι′<ιVar(Rι′) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{j}. (Note that since Rι is normalized, the ti’s
are free terms.)
Intuitively for executing a protocol step Rι ⇒ Sι on receiving a (normalized) message
m in a protocol run it is first checked whether m and Rι match, i.e., whether there exists
a ground substitution σ such that m =E Rισ. If so pSισq is returned as output. We always
assume that the messages exchanged between principals (and the intruder) are normalized
— therefore, m is assumed to be normalized and the output of the above rule is not Sισ
but pSισq. This is because principals and the intruder cannot distinguish between equivalent
terms and therefore they may only work on normalized terms (representing the corresponding
equivalence class of terms). Finally we note that since the different protocol rules may share
variables, some of the variables in Rι and Sι may be already bounded by substitutions
obtained from previous applications of protocol rules. We are not actually interested in a
normal execution of a protocol but rather in attacks on a protocol. This is the reason why
the definition of a protocol contains the initial intruder knowledge.
Condition 1. , in the above definition is not a restriction since the transformation per-
formed by a protocol rule and its normalized variant coincide. Condition 2. guarantees
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that when an output is produced with Sι all variables in Sι are already “bounded”. Oth-
erwise, the output of a protocol rule would be arbitrary, since unbounded variables could
be mapped to any message. Condition 3. guarantees that the bounding of variables is de-
terministic. For example if the protocol rule ⊕({x, y}) ⇒ 〈x, y〉 is the first one and thus,
x and y are not bounded, then this rule violates Condition 3: On receiving ⊕({a, b, c}),
for instance, different substitutions are possible, including {x 7→ ⊕({a, b}), y 7→ c}, {x 7→
⊕({b, d}), y 7→ ⊕({a, c, d})}, etc. In other words, a principal must guess a substitution.
We have shown in [8] that every deterministic protocol can be transformed in a protocol
satisfying Condition 3.
The protocol informally described in Section 3 can formally be stated as follows: Agent
a plays role A and agent b role B; We define I = {1, 2, 3, 4}; The initial knowledge of the
intruder is S =
{
0,   ,  ,  ,  ,  −1,   ,   }, and the protocol rules are:
1 : 0 ⇒ {〈   ,   〉}p	

2 : {〈x  ,   〉}   ⇒{〈   ,⊕({x  ,  })〉}p	 
3 :{〈x  ,⊕({   ,  })〉}p	  ⇒ {x  }p	

4 : {   }p	  ⇒ 0
Our aim is to determine, given the initial knowledge of the intruder, the set of substi-
tutions σ such that this ordering of messages corresponds to a possible execution. Before
proceeding further, we need to formalize the deduction abilities of the intruder.
5 Threat Model
In this section, we model by hostile environment of execution by an active intruder. The
knowledge of this intruder as well as its deduction abilities are formalized respectively as a
set of terms and as rewrite rules over sets of terms.
5.1 The Intruder
We assume that a protocol is run across a hostile environment where the source of the
received messages cannot be established. This environment is modeled by an evil actor,
called the intruder, trying to reach a state that should be banned by the protocol. If the
goal of the protocol is to ensure the secrecy of a data M , the forbidden states are those
where the intruder knows M . If the goal of the protocol is to ensure authentication of the
participants, the forbidden states are those where a honest participant wrongly assumes that
a message M it has received originates from another participant.
An attack on a trace-based property of a protocol can be viewed as a particular inter-
leaving of a finite number of protocol sessions. For instance an attack on secrecy can be
modeled by adding a message to the protocol where the intruder has to send the confidential
piece of data. If this extended protocol admits a feasible execution then the initial protocol
can be considered as insecure.
INRIA
Constraint Solving with Xor 9
Name Deduction rule
Lc,〈 , 〉 a, b→ 〈a, b〉
Lc,{ }s a, b→ {a}
s
b
Lc,{ }p a, b→ {a}
p
b
Lc,⊕ a1, . . . , an → p⊕({a1, . . . , an})q
Table 1: Composition rules
An execution is feasible if every message received by the honest agents can be derived
by the intruder from his initial knowledge and intercepted messages. Hence building an
insecure protocol execution reduces to a system of constraints to be solved in a particular
term algebra. The variables to be solved correspond to the part of the protocol messages
that are not read by the honest agents (e.g. because they are encrypted with an unknown
key).
The security of the protocol is assessed versus an intruder as strong as possible. We
assume it can divert all messages sent by honest participants and add their content to its
knowledge, it can send messages its knowledge permits to deduce under the identity of other
actors, and may perform deductions over its knowledge to this end.
5.2 Intruder Deduction Rules
The knowledge of the intruder is represented by a set of normalized messages, i.e. is a subset
of pT(F ,X )q. The deductions that the intruder can perform from its knowledge are modeled
by rewrite rules l → r (read: From l deduce r) where l is a set of messages (a subset of
T(F ,X )) and r is a message (a term). The right-hand side of a rule is its result. We shall
only consider rules l → r where both l and r are in normal form (i.e. plq = l and prq = r).
In order to have lighter notation, and under this hypothesis, we omit the normalization
function pq when not necessary. The available deduction rules are split into two disjoint
sets: Composition rules and decomposition rules.
Let l → r be a deduction rule. It is a decomposition rule iff there exists t ∈ l such that
r is a strict maximal subterm of t. Otherwise, it is a composition rule. We always assume
r /∈ l, since such rules do not permit to deduce new terms.
In Tables 5.2 and 2 we give the rules considered in this paper. The rule:
a1, . . . , an → p⊕(a1, . . . , an)q
is a composition rule if the right-hand side is a ⊕-term, and a decomposition rule if its head
operator is a constant or a free constructor.
We note:
  Lc,f = Lc,〈 , 〉 ∪ Lc,{ }s ∪ Lc,{ }p
RR n
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Name Deduction rule Decomposed term Condition
Ld,〈 , 〉
1 〈a, b〉 → a 〈a, b〉 ∅
Ld,〈 , 〉
2 〈a, b〉 → b 〈a, b〉 ∅
Ld,{ }s {a}
s
b , b→ a {a}
s
b b
Ld,{ }p {a}
p
b , b
−1 → a {a}pb b
−1
Ld,⊕ a1, . . . , an → p⊕({a1, . . . , an})q a1 ∅
Table 2: Decomposition rules
  Ld,f = Ld,〈 , 〉
1 ∪ Ld,〈 , 〉
2 ∪ Ld,{ }s ∪ Ld,{ }p
  Lc = Lc,f ∪ Lc,⊕, Ld = Ld,f ∪ Ld,⊕
  Lf = Lc,f ∪ Ld,f , L⊕ = Lc,⊕ ∪ Ld,⊕
  L = Lf ∪ L⊕ = Lc ∪ Ld
Transition relation and derivations. Let E and F be two normalized sets of terms,
and L a subset of L. We write E →L F if there exists a rule l → r in L such that l ⊆ E and
F = {r}∪E. We denote by →∗ the reflexive and transitive closure of →. If L = {l → r}, we
simply note E →l→r F . Without loss of generality, we also always assume that if E →l→r F ,
then r /∈ E. Under this assumption, a sequence of transitions E1 →L . . .→L En is called a
derivation on L. We say this derivation starts from E1 and has goal En \En−1. A derivation
D : E →∗L F starting from E and of goal t is defined to be well-formed if F ⊆ Sub(E ∪ {t}).
We have proved in [9] the following useful result:
Proposition 1 (Existence of well-formed derivations) Let E be a normalized set of terms
and t be a term in normal form. There exists a well-formed formed derivation on L starting
from E of goal t if, and only if, there exists a derivation on L starting from E of goal t.
5.3 Set of Deducible Messages and Properties
Let R be any system of rewrite rules over sets of terms.
Definition 2 We note E
R
the set of messages deducible from E using the rewrite system
R:
E
R
= {t | ∃E′, E →∗R E
′ and t ∈ E′}
In the case of intruder deduction system L, we simply note E the set E
L
. We have
given the proofs of the two following propositions as they are both easy and very important.
Indeed, Proposition 3 permits to link a set of messages with all the possible instantiations
of the variables.
INRIA
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Proposition 2 Suppose F ⊆ E . Then E = F ∪E
Proof. This proposition is based on the fact that the operator is idempotent (E = E )
and growing for ⊆ (E ⊆ F implies E ⊆ F ). The announced equality follows from these two
properties by a double inclusion argument.
Proposition 3 Let E and F be two sets of terms. We have E = F iff for all substitutions
σ, we have Eσ = Fσ
Proof. The right to left direction is trivial: Consider the Identity substitution. To prove
the left to right direction, we note that for all sets of terms E, if E →∗L E
′, then E = E′ .
The equality E = F implies there exists a set of terms G such that E →∗ G and F →∗ G.
Let σ be a substitution. One can check that l → r ∈ L implies plσq → prσq ∈ L. Thus, we
have pEσq →∗ pGσq and pFσq →∗ pGσq. By construction, we have:
{
pGσq ⊆ pEσq
pGσq ⊆ pFσq
Thus, Proposition 2 permits to conclude.
6 Simultaneous Construction Problems
We now introduce constraints that an intruder has to solve in order to build a protocol
execution leading to an attack.
Definition 3 A Construction Problem is a pair (E, t) noted EB t with E a finite subset of
pT(F ,X )q and t ∈ pT(F ,X )q. A substitution σ satisfies E B t iff ptσq ∈ pEσq. In this case,
we note:
σ |= E B t
Definition 4 A Simultaneous Construction Problem (SCP) is a finite sequence of construc-
tion problems (Ei B ti)i∈{1,...,n} such that:
1. for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all x ∈ Var(Ei), there exists j < i such that x ∈ Var(tj) ;
2. for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with i < j, there exists Fj ⊆ Ej such that Fj = Ei
3. for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if ⊕({u1, . . . , ul}) ∈ Sub(ti), then there exists at most one j such
that Var(uj) 6⊆ Var(t1, . . . , ti−1).
Moreover, we assume that if n ≥ 1, then E1 6= ∅. In the case of protocol analysis, this
can be ensured e.g. by stating that the intruder always knows her name. The last condition
is true by the Condition 3. on protocols when a SCP is built by an execution order over a
protocol P . It will be easy to see that all transformations on SCP’s that will be defined in
the following preserve this property.
RR n
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Definition 5 (Satisfiability of SCP) Let L be a set of deduction rules over sets of terms. A
SCP C is σ-satisfiable for L if:
for all E B t in C, σ |= E BL t
We note   (C) the set of substitutions σ such that C is σ-satisfiable.
The next definition will allow us to obtain a generic description of the set of solutions of
an SCP. Since attacks in our setting are substitutions let us define the set of prefixes of a
set of substitutions.
Definition 6 (Prefix set) A set of substitutions Θ is a prefix of a set of substitutions Σ if:
{
∀σ ∈ Σ ∃τ ∃ρ ∈ Θ, σ = ρτ
∀τ ∈ Θ ∃ρ τρ ∈ Σ
The first condition ensures that all substitutions in the set Σ are instances of a substi-
tution in the prefix set. The second condition ensures that each substitution in the prefix
set covers a non-empty subset of Σ. Thus, if Θ is a prefix set of Σ, the set Θ is empty if,
and only if, Σ is empty. Note that the notion of prefix set is weaker than the notion of most
general unifier (summarized as: All the instances are solutions). Suppose Θ is the prefix set
of a set Σ, and let τ ∈ Θ. Then there might exist a substitution ρ such that τρ is not in Σ.
For example, the set {Id} is a prefix set of any non-empty set of substitutions Σ but unless
Σ is the set of all substitutions, not all instances of Id are in Σ 
Connection with Protocols. Let P = ({Rι ⇒ Sι, ι ∈ I},S) be a protocol with I =
{1, . . . , n}. A sequence of ground terms m1, . . . ,mn forms a valid trace of the protocol if
there exists a substitution σ such that mi = pSiσq for all i ∈ I and if the intruder was able
at every stage to deduce pRiσq. This condition can be formalized as follows. Let Fi be the
knowledge of the intruder after she has diverted the i-th message. One has:
{
F0 = S
Fi = Fi−1 ∪
{
pSiσq
}
The intruder can deduce, at every stage, all mi if, for all i ∈ I, one has:
pRiσq ∈ Fi−1
Conversely, if these facts hold for σ, then pS1σq, . . . , pSnσq is a valid trace of the protocol.
Let us now define:
{
E0 = S
Ei = Ei−1 ∪ {Si}
From what precedes, all the valid traces of the protocol P are given by the solutions of the
SCP:
C = E0 BR1, . . . , En−1 BRn
INRIA
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However, the set   (C) may be infinite. In order to decide whether a protocol has a
secrecy attack, it is sufficient to be able to decide whether the SCP C associated to a protocol
is satisfiable. But other trace-based properties need a finer result to be decided. For example,
one needs to know the possible values of the protocol variables in order to decide if a given
protocol has an authentication flaw. Thus, our aim is not to decide the emptyness of the
set C, but to find a finite and symbolic representation of it. As a consequence, we will solve
the following more general problem:
  	
 (C): find a finite prefix set Θ of    (C);
6.1 Solved form
We first introduce the notion of SCP in solved form. This notion is a generalization of the
one considered in [24] for the Dolev-Yao intruder in the free theory. Given a set of variables
X let us note FV(t) = Factor(t) ∩ X .
Definition 7 (Solved form) Let C = (Ei B ti)i∈{1,...,n} be a SCP, and let X be the set of
variables appearing in C. We say C is in solved form if:
 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} , FV(ti) = {xi} and i 6= j implies xi 6= xj ;
 X = {x1, . . . , xn}.
This notion is crucial because of the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Every SCP in solved form is satisfiable.
Proof. Let C = (Ei B ti)i∈{1,...,n} be a SCP in solved form, and let X = {x1, . . . , xn}. The
conditions on the solved form imply that there exists a bijection between the construction
equations Ei B ti and the variables. Hence up to re-indexing if necessary, one has either
ti = xi or ti = ⊕({xi, ti,1, . . . , ti,ni}). The third property of SCPs then implies that for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, one has Var(ti,1, . . . , ti,ni) ⊆ Var(t1, . . . , ti−1). For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let ui = 0
if ti = xi and ui = ⊕({ti,1, . . . , ti,ni}) otherwise. The unification problem U :
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} , xi
?
= ui
is then in solved form: One obtains a solution σ by replacing, for i from 1 to n, all the
variables y in ui by yσ which is already computed. By definition of σ as a solution of U , we
have:
pCσq = pE1σq B 0, . . . , pEnσq B 0
which is trivially satisfiable. Hence C has at least one solution σ.
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7 Normalization of SCP’s
We introduce a normalization procedure for transforming an SCP into a simpler equivalent
one. In the remaining part of this subsection, we give some normalization rules on SCP’s.
In this paper we only give normalization rules to prove the completeness of L. For a faster
constraint-solving algorithm one may add more normalization rules as the ones given in [8]
for free operators such as encryption and pairing.
Proposition 5 Let
C = Cα, E ∪ {ux} B t, Cβ
be a SCP such that there exists ExBtx in Cα with FV(tx) = FV(ux) = {x} and x /∈ Var(Ex).
Then C is equivalent to:
C′ = Cα, E ∪
{
p⊕({ux, tx})q
}
B t, Cβ
We note C ⇒⊕,l C′.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that, for all substitution σ such that σ |= Ex B tx, then
σ |= E ∪ {ux} B t if, and only if, σ |= E ∪
{
p⊕({ux, tx})q
}
B t. Let us prove the only if
direction, and thus suppose:
{
σ |= Ex B tx
σ |= E ∪ {ux} B t
By Condition 1. on SCPs, there exists F ⊆ E∪{ux} such that F = Ex . Since x /∈ Var()(Ex),
we have x /∈ Var()(F ), and thus F ⊆ E. The equality F = Ex and Proposition 3 imply:
ptxσq ∈ pFσq ⊆ pEσq
Thus, it is clear that:
pEσq ∪
{
puxσq
}
= pEσq ∪
{
p⊕({tx, ux})σq
}
and therefore ptσq ∈ pEσq ∪
{
puxσq
}
implies ptσq ∈ pEσq ∪
{
p⊕({tx, ux})σq
}
. In other words
we have:
σ |= E ∪
{
p⊕({ux, tx})q
}
B t
Proposition 6 Let
C = Cα, E B {ux} , Cβ
be a SCP such that there exists Ex B tx in Cα with FV(tx) = FV(ux) = {x}. Then C is
equivalent to:
C′ = Cα, E B
{
p⊕({ux, tx})q
}
, Cβ
We note C ⇒⊕,r C′.
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Proof. By condition 2. on SCP, there exists a subset F of E such that Ex = F ⊆ E .
Given a substitution σ, we have σ ∈    (C) implies:
{
ptxσq ∈ pExσq
puxσq ∈ pEσq
By Proposition 3, we also have:
ptxσq ∈ pFσq
and thus, since F ⊆ E and again by Proposition 3:
ptxσq ∈ pExσq
Hence, applying the rule:
ptxσq, puxσq → p⊕(
{
ptxσq, puxσq
}
)q
one obtains that p⊕(
{
ptxσq, puxσq
}
)q is also in pExσq. But we have the equality:
p⊕(
{
ptxσq, puxσq
}
)q = p⊕({ux, tx})σq
and thus:
σ |= E B p⊕({ux, tx})q
Thus, and given the notations of the proposition, we have:
σ |= C′
Conversely, if σ |= C′, and by a similar proof, we have σ |= C.
Note that in Propositions 5 and 6, by definition of the normalization function pq, we
have FV(p⊕({ux, tx})q) = ∅.
We write C ⇒ C′ if either C ⇒⊕,r C′ or C ⇒⊕,l C′. A SCP C is in normal form if there
does not exist C′ such that C ⇒ C′ and if all its subterms are in normal form for pq.
8 A System for Solving SCP
We transform the SCP using rules of a system L. These rules can be partitionned in two
subsets: those applying to terms whose root symbol, for a solution σ, is in the free theory,
called Lf , and those applying to xor terms, called L⊕. We now define these systems.
The notation σ ∈ mgu (u, t) means that the substitution σ is a most general solution of
the unification problem u
?
= t over the theory E = E1 ∪ E2, with E1 the free theory over
standard Dolev-Yao operations (concatenation –〈 , 〉–, symmetric key encryption –{ }s– and
public key encryption –{ }p–), and E2 is the ACUN theory of the ⊕ operator and 0. Note
that the set of most general unifiers is either empty or finite up to renaming.
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8.1 The Rules in Lf
In Figure 1 the symbol f is any free operator in {〈 , 〉 , { }s , { }p}. Intuitively, the Comp
rule is the counterpart for the SCPs of the rules of Table 5.2 that are associated with free
constructors. Symmetrically, the Dec rule is the counterpart of the rules of Table 2 associated
with free constructors.
The Unif rule plays a different role. It is applied when the term to be built is in the
knowledge of the intruder once a substitution is applied.
   :
Cα, E B t, Cβ
(Cα, E B x1, E B x2, Cβ)σ
σ ∈ mgu (t, f(x1, x2))
	
:
Cα, E B t, Cβ
(Cα, E B Cond(f(x1, x2)), E ∪ Res(f(x1, x2)) B t, Cα)σ
u ∈ E,
σ ∈ mgu (u, f(x1, x2))

 
:
Cα, E B t, Cβ
(Cα, Cβ)σ
u ∈ E, σ ∈ mgu (u, t)
Figure 1: System Lf of transformation rules.
8.2 The Rules in L⊕
The rules in L⊕ are used to treat specifically the case of the xor operator. They are given
in Figure 2.
The
   ⊕ (resp.

⊕) rule has no real counterpart in Tables 5.2 and 2. On the other
hand, the    ⊕ rule corresponds to the application of a deduction rule:
a1, . . . , an → p⊕({a1, . . . , an})q
regardless of whether this is a composition or decomposition rule.
We note C →l C′ if l is an applicable rule of L.
8.3 Restrictions on the Application of Rules in L
Consider a rule of L:
C = Cα,  , Cβ
C′
INRIA
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   ⊕ :
Cα, E B ⊕ ({t1, . . . , tn}), Cβ
Cα, E B t1, E B ⊕ ({t2, . . . , tn}), Cβ

⊕ :
Cα, E B t, Cβ
Cα, E B ⊕ ({t2, . . . , tn}), E ∪ {t1} B t, Cβ
⊕({t1, . . . , tn}) ∈ E
   ⊕ :
Cα, E B t, Cβ
(Cα, Cβ)σ
U ⊆ E, σ ∈ mgu (
⊕
u∈U u, t)
Figure 2: System L⊕ of transformation rules.
Note that in the above notation, Cα is a SCP, but not Cβ . We do several hypotheses on
C and C’ for such a rule to be applicable.
First, we assume the SCP C is normalized. This means that, when applying rules, one
should start from a SCP in normal form, and each SCP deduced must be normalized before
being employed in further deductions.
Second, we impose in the above rule that Cα has to be empty or in solved form. Moreover,
we impose that if a rule applies on a term u or t, then:
FV(u) = FV(t) = ∅
Since the SCP is normalized, this is always the case for a term on the left-hand side of a
construction problem. If the rule applies on the right-hand side t of E B t, this restriction
implies this problem is not in solved form.
In order to ensure termination, we also forbid the application of the Dec rule twice on
the same term. This may be formalized using e.g. tagging of terms.
9 Example
We now illustrate our procedure on the attack example of Section 3. Let us note E0 =
{   ,  ,   ,   ,  ,  ,   −1} the initial knowledge of the intruder and:
  E1 = E0 ∪ {{〈   ,   〉}p	
 }
  E2 = E1 ∪ {{〈   ,⊕({x   ,  })〉}p	  }
  E3 = E2 ∪ {{x  }p	
 }
Given the protocol description in Section 4, the SCP corresponding to the search of an
attack is:
E0 B 0, E1 B {〈x   ,   〉}p	  ,
E2 B {〈x  ,⊕({   ,  })〉}p	  , E3 B {   }p	 
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The first construction problem can be eliminated by the Unif rule. In order to simplify nota-
tions, let Cβ = E2B {〈x  ,⊕({    , I})〉}p	  , E3B {   }p	  .The intruder immediately decompose
the message sent by a.
E1 B {〈x   ,   〉}p	  , Cβ
E1 B  −1, E1 ∪ {〈    ,   〉} B {〈x   ,   〉}p	  , Cβ

E1 ∪ {〈   ,   〉} B {〈x  ,   〉}p	  , Cβ

   
E1 ∪ {   ,   , 〈   ,   〉} B {〈x   ,   〉}p	  , Cβ
	
From now on, we note E ′1 = E1 ∪ {   ,   , 〈   ,   〉}. We apply twice the Comp rule on the first
remaining problem:
E′1 B {〈x  ,   〉}p	  , Cβ
E′1 B 〈x   ,   〉 , E′1 B 

, Cβ
  
E′1 B x   , E′1 B   , E′1 B 

, Cβ
  
The Unif rule again permits to eliminate the second and third construction problem since  
and   are in E0. Note that up to this point, all the rules applied preserve the satisfiability,
and thus could be implemented as normalization rules. The next step is non-deterministic,
since the intruder does not know   −1.
Let σ be the most general unifier of the two terms
The two terms {〈x  ,⊕({    ,  })〉}p	  and {〈   ,⊕({x  , b})〉}p	  have only one most general
unifier, the substitution σ such that:
σ :
{
x  7→  
x   7→ ⊕({   ,  ,  })
Let us note E′3 = E3σ. We have:
E′3 = E1 ∪ {{〈 

,⊕({   ,  })〉}p	  , {   }p	
 }
The rule inference is:
E′1 B x  , E2 B {〈x  ,⊕({   ,  })〉}p	  , E3 B { 

}p
	 
E′1 B ⊕ ({   ,

,  }), E′3 B { 

}p	 

 
The    ⊕ rule can be applied (with the identity substitution) to remove the first constraint:

,  ,   , . . .B ⊕ ({    ,  ,  }), E3 B {   }p	 
E′3 B { 

}p
	 
   ⊕
INRIA
Constraint Solving with Xor 19
Before proceeding further, the intruder decomposes the message {   }p	
 :
E′3 B { 

}p	 
E′3 B  −1, E′3 ∪ { 

} B {   }p	 

E′3 ∪ { 

} B {   }p	 

   
Finally, this last constraint is eliminated through the application of the rule Comp followed
by two applications of the rule Unif with the identity substitution.
E′3 ∪ { 

} B {   }p	 
E′3 ∪ { 

} B   , E′3 ∪ { 

} B  
  
E′3 ∪ { 

}B  

 
∅

   
In this case, the substitution found was:
σ :
{
x  7→  
x   7→ ⊕({   ,  ,  })
Note that in this case, the substitution is ground. As a consequence, and by definition
of solved forms, this implies that the final SCP produced is empty. Unless other sequences
of transformations leading to different substitutions are found, this means that there is only
one feasible execution of this protocol.
10 Termination
10.1 Ordering on SCP
In the sequel we compare SCP in order, first, to simplify them and second to prove termi-
nation of the system L of SCP transformations.
First, let us recall that if ≺1 and ≺2 are two well-founded orderings on sets S1 and S2
respectively, then:
  The lexicographic ordering on S1 × S2 is also well-founded;
  The extension of ≺1 to multisets of elements of S1 (functions from S1 to
  
of finite
support) is also a well-founded ordering.
Given a term t, we define the scale of t the pair (|FV(t)|,Factor(t)). Let us order the
scales by (n, t) ≺scale (n′, t′) if n < n′ or n = n′ and the multiset Factor(t) is smaller than
Factor(t′) for the extension of the subterm relation to multisets. Since the order on
  
and
the subterm ordering are well-founded, so is the ordering on the scales. As a consequence,
this ordering can be extended to a well-founded ordering on multisets of scales.
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We now give an order on SCPs to prove that our transformation system, as well as the
normalization rules, terminates. Let C be a SCP. We associate to C a quadruple Π(C) =
(v,Md,Mc, e) with:
  v the number of variables in C ;
  Md the multiset of scales of terms on which it is possible to apply the rule    ;
  Mc the multiset of scales of right-hand sides of construction problems in C ;
  e the number of construction problems C.
Let ≺scp be the lexicographic ordering on these quadruples. As a lexicographic combination
of well-founded orderings, ≺scp is well-founded.
We also note that Π(pCq) scp Π(C). From now on, we assume all the terms of C are in
normal form. Note that if C ⇒ C ′, then C′ ≺ C. Since ≺ is noetherian, the normalization
process terminates.
10.2 Termination
We recall that for any SCP C, if C ⇒∗ C′ and C′ is normalized, then C′ scp C. Thus, to
prove termination of our transformation system, it suffices to prove that for any rule l of L,
if C →l C′, then C′ ≺scp C. The following theorem is essential to this end, and is proven in
the appendix.
Theorem 1 Let s
?
= t be a unification problem modulo E1 ∪E2, and let σ be a most general
solution of this problem. Then either σ = Id or:
|Var(sσ) ∪ Var(tσ)| < |Var(s) ∪ Var(t)|
Proposition 7 Let C be a SCP, l be a rule in L, and suppose C →l C
′. Then C′ ≺scp C.
Proof. Let l be a rule of L. First, consider the case where the substitution σ applied
is not the identity. In the case of the rules

 
and    ⊕, it is evident by Theorem 1
that the number of variables in the resulting SCP is strictly decreasing. In the case of
the
   rule, if t si not a ⊕-term, then necessarily t = f(t1, t2), and the substitution σ
is the identity on the variables of the SCP. Otherwise, since the SCP is in normal form,
we have necessarily FV(t) = ∅. Thus, there exists n > 1 free terms t1, . . . , tn such that
t = ⊕({t1, . . . , tn}), and thus there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that ptσq = ptiσq. Without loss
of generality, suppose that ptσq = pt1σq. The substitution σ applied is thus the solution of
the equations t1
?
= f(x1, x2) and ⊕({t2, . . . , tn})
?
= 0. Since neither x1 nor x2 are variables
of C, the solution of the first equation is the identity on Var(C), whereas the second one
contains only variables of C. Since t is in normal form, the identity cannot be a solution of
the second equation. Thus, by Theorem 1, there are strictly less variables in C ′ than in C.
The case of the Dec rule is similar.
Second, if the substitution applied is the identity, one proves that the rule is decreasing
for the order ≺scp. This is in particular the case for the
	
⊕ and the
   ⊕ rules.
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As a corollary of Proposition 7, the well-foundedness of the order ≺scp implies the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 2 (Termination of L) Starting from a SCP C, the strategy of application of rules
of L terminates.
11 Completeness of L
We prove in this section the completeness of the transformation system L to solve the
problems  	
 (C). Before proving Theorem 3 in Subsection 11.3, we first investigate two
special cases in Subsections 11.1 and 11.2.
11.1 Case of a SCP solvable using only composition rules
In this subsection, we consider the case of a SCP C = Cα, E B t in normal form where Cα is
in solved form, and there exists a substitution σ such that C is σ-satisfiable for Lc.
Proposition 8 Either C is in solved form or there exists C ′ satisfiable such that C →∗l C
′.
Moreover, if στ is the substitution applied on C to yield C ′, there exists a substitution τ such
that σττ = σ and C′ is τ -satisfiable for Lc.
Proof. Suppose C is not in solved form. By definition, there exists a well-formed derivation
on Lc starting from pEσq of goal ptσq.
If this derivation is of length 0, i.e. ptσq ∈ pEσq, there exists u ∈ E such that puσq = ptσq.
Hence, it suffice to apply the rule Unif. Let στ ∈ mgu (u, t). By definition of a mgu, there
exists τ such that σττ = σ, and thus Cστ is τ satisfiable.
Else, consider the last rule F → ptσq of this derivation.
If it is in Lc,f , then we can apply the rule Comp. Suppose ptσq = f(t1, t2). Then there is a
substitution στ such that στ is in mgu (t, f(x1, x2)) and is a more general than σ. Thus, there
exists τ such that στ τ = σ. Thus Cαστ is τ -satisfiable. Since the last rule is a composition
rule t1, t2 → f(t1, t2), then t1, t2 ∈ Eσ
c
, and thus the system (Cα, E B x1, E B x2)στ is τ
satisfiable.
Else, ptσq is a ⊕-term and the rule is in Lc,⊕. We partition the left-hand side F into two
sets F1 and F2, with F1 ⊆ pEσq and F2 ∩ pEσq = ∅, and let F2 = {a1, . . . , an}.
First, we need to prove the following claim on the rules L⊕.
Claim. If E →L⊕ E, t→L⊕ E, t, u, then E →L⊕ u
Proof. Suppose E →F1→t E, t→F2→u E, t, u. The result is trivial if t /∈ F2. Else, and
noting ∆ the symmetric difference of sets, the rule (F1∆(F2 \ {t})) → u is a L⊕ rule
whose left-hand side is included in E.
Claim. One can assume w.l.o.g. that F2 = ∅.
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Proof. By the first claim, we can assume no ai is the result of a L⊕ rule. Thus, and
since the derivation contains only composition rules all the ai are terms with a free head
operator. The definition of L⊕ rules, together with the definition of the normalization
function pq, implies that each ai is a maximal subterm of a term u = ⊕({u1, . . . , un})σ,
with either u = t or u in E.
Since the system is normalised by the rule ⇒ defined in Section 7, no uj is a variable,
and thus there exists j such that pujσq = ai. In the first case, one can apply the rule   ⊕, and in the second case, one can apply the rule
	
⊕ to remove ai from F .
After application of these rules, one can assume F2 = ∅.
Note that all ai are built using only composition rules, and thus the SCP obtained is
still a SCP σ-satisfiable for Lc.
By the claim, we assume that F ⊆ pEσq. Let U be a subset of E such that pUσq = F
and ΣU = mgu (⊕u∈Uu, t). Since one has p(⊕u∈Uu)σq = ptσq, there exists one substitution
στ in ΣU more general than σ, and let τ be such that στ τ = σ. Thus, it is possible to apply
the rule    ⊕ with U and στ chosen such that the resulting system C’ is τ satisfiable and
στ τ = σ.
It is now possible to apply the rule    ⊕ with U chosen such that pUσq = F .
Proposition 9 If σ |=Lc Cα, E B t, and Cα is in solved form, then there exists C
′ such that
C →∗ C′ and C′ is in solved form. Moreover, if στ is the substitution applied on C to yield
C′, there exists a substitution τ such that στ τ = σ and C′ is τ -satisfiable for Lc.
Proof. Let us apply Proposition 8 iteratively starting from C. This yields a sequence
C1, . . . , Cn, . . . , of SCP such that, for all i, C →∗ Ci and Ci is satisfiable. Since the system
L terminates this sequence is finite. By Proposition 8 the last SCP C ′ in the sequence is in
solved form. The remaining properties are direct consequences of Proposition 8.
11.2 Case of a SCP in almost Decomposed Form
We say a SCP E1 B t1, . . . , En B tn is in a almost decomposed form for σ if the SCP E1 B
t1, . . . , En−1Btn−1 is σ-satisfiable for Lc and the construction equationEnBtn is σ-satisfiable
for L.
In this subsection, we consider the case of a SCP C = Cα, EB t in normal form where Cα
is in solved form, and there exists a substitution σ such that C is almost decomposed for σ.
Proposition 10 With the above notations, either C is σ-satisfiable for Lc, or there exists
C′ and two substitutions στ and τ such that C →∗ C′ and στ is the substitution applied,
στ τ = σ and C
′ is almost decomposed for τ .
Proof. Suppose C is not σ-satisfiable for Lc, and let D be a well-formed derivation of
minimal length
pEσq = E0 → LE1 →L . . .→L En
starting from pEσq and of goal ptσq.
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By hypothesis, there exists a minimal index i such that Ei → lEi+1 is in D and l ∈ Ld.
Let di be the term decomposed by this rule.
Since the derivation D is well-formed and of minimal length, a straightforward case
analysis on the composition rules shows that di is not the result of a composition rule and
thus di ∈ pEσq.
Let u ∈ E be a term such that puσq = di. If l ∈ Ld,⊕, we can apply

⊕, else we apply	
. The equality puσq = di ensures the existence of a mgu στ and a substitution τ such
that στ τ = σ. The choice of the first decomposition rule ensures that the resulting system
is of the shape C′α, E
′ B t′ with C′α a SCP that is τ -satisfiable for Lc, and thus C
′ is almost
decomposed for τ .
Proposition 11 If σ |=Lc Cα, EB t, and Cα is in solved form, then there exists C
′ such that
C →∗ C′ and C′ is in solved form. Moreover, if στ is the substitution applied on C to yield
C′, there exists a substitution τ such that στ τ = σ and C′ is τ -satisfiable.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 9.
In other words, if a SCP C is almost decomposed for a substitution σ, there exists a
sequence of transformations from C to a SCP C’ in solved form and such that the substitution
στ produced by this sequence is more general than σ.
11.3 General Case
We now consider a generic SCP C in normal form, and a substitution σ such that σ |= C.
Theorem 3 There exists C ′ in solved form such that C →∗ C′. Moreover, if στ is the
substitution applied on C to yield C ′ then there exists a substitution τ such that στ τ = σ and
C′ is τ -satisfiable for Lc.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose C is a counter-example SCP with a minimal number of
construction problems. Under this hypothesis, C has at least one construction problem, and
thus let C = Cα, E B t.
We note that Cα is itself a σ-satisfiable SCP. By minimality, there exists a SCP C
′
α, and
two substitutions στ and τ such that Cα →∗ C′α, the substitution applied from Cα to C
′
α is
στ , C′α is τ -satisfiable for Lc and στ τ = σ. By the last equality, Cστ is also τ -satisfiable.
Thus, we have a sequence of transformations:
Cα, E B t→
∗ C′′ = C′α, pEστq B ptστq
This SCP is almost decomposed for τ . Thus, Proposition 11 permits one to derive a con-
tradiction.
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12 Decidability of Prefix(C)
The results obtained permit to decide the problem Prefix(C). Starting from C, rules of L
are applied to generate as many SCPs as possible. For each generated SCP C’, let σC′ be
the substitution applied along the deductions starting from C and ending in C’. Finally, let
us define:
ΠC = {σC′ | C
′ in solved form}
We have:
1. Termination: By Theorem 2, the procedure terminates, and thus ΠC is finite;
2. Correctness: Every σ ∈ ΠC is a prefix of a substitution in    (C);
3. Completeness: By Theorem 3, for every τ ∈    (C), there exists σ ∈ ΠC such that σ is
a prefix of τ .
Thus, ΠC is a prefix set of   (C) and we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 4 The problem Prefix(C) is decidable.
13 Conclusion
For sake of clarity we have not considered the issue of authentication flaws detection. This
goal can be modelled by disequations between parts of messages sent and received. These
disequations state that either the sender is not the one that is expected or the value received
is different from the sent one. Note that our decidability result of [9] does not work with
disequations and therefore cannot be easily extended to authentication properties. However
the procedure we have presented in this paper computes a finite prefix set of all substitu-
tions satisfying an execution order π. Applying the substitutions in the prefix set on the
inequalities it should be easy to deduce whether some of them are satisfiable and thus if
there exists an authentication flaw.
As future works we plan to finish the implementation of the protocol analysis procedure
and tune it by exploiting possible optimizations of the unification algorithms as they were
proposed by [3]. We shall also investigate other theories (e.g. abelian groups) to which the
approach applies trying to find a general criteria.
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Appendix: Solving Unification Problems
We consider, in this section the case of unification modulo a theory E = E1 ∪E2 where E1
is the free theory over a non-empty signature Σ1, and E2 is the theory over the signature
Σ2 = {0,⊕} presented by the following axioms :
x⊕ (y ⊕ z) = (x⊕ y) ⊕ z (A)
x⊕ y = y ⊕ x (C)
x⊕ 0 = x (U)
x⊕ x = 0 (N)
The combination result in [3] implies that unification modulo E is decidable and, in
fact, unifiability in NP (see also [18] for a specific treatment of the ACUN theory). Since
both theories E1 and E2 are unitary, the resulting theory E is finitary, the different possible
unifiers stemming from the combination phase. Beside these well-known results, and in
order to prove the termination of our constraints-solving algorithm, we need a finer result
on the number of variables before and after the application of a most general unifier modulo
E.
13.1 Presentation of the combination algorithm
We briefly present, in this section, the combination algorithm given in [3]. This six-steps
algorithm consists in the transformation of a unification problem s
?
= t modulo E1 ∪E2 into
a set S of equations modulo E1 or E2 by guessing some properties of a most general unifier
σ (if it exists). We suppose the theories E1 and E2 are consistant. We apply unfailing
completion procedure (see [16] for definition and properties) to obtain a (possibly infinite)
confluent rewrite system R that terminates on ground terms over the signature Σ1 ∪ Σ2.
Given a term t, we note (t)↓R its normal form for R. In the sequel, we always assume
substitution are in normal form: For all variable x and for all substitution σ, we have
xσ = (xσ)↓R.
We denote by Si the set of equations after step i, and define S0 =
{
s
?
= t
}
. We note
S5,j the subset of equations in S5 that will be solved in theory j ∈ {1, 2}. The aim of the
algorithm is to build two pure systems of equations, that is one over Σ1 modulo the theory
E1, and one over Σ2 modulo the theory E2. In the process of purification of equations,
variables are introduced to represent maximal alien subterms of a term (steps 1. and 2.).
1. terms purification: For simplification of the presentation, one replaces in a bottom-
up way each subterm r = r′[t1, . . . , tn], where the ti are alien subterms of r, of the
initial unification problem by the term r′[x1, . . . , xn] and adds problems xi
?
= ti to S0,
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
2. equations purification: Adding variables and problems to S1 if necessary, one en-
sures that all equations in S2 are pure;
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3. variables identification: One chooses an equivalence relation over variables of S2,
and replaces each variable by the representant of its class;
4. choice of theory: One chooses, for each class of variables, a theory 1. or 2. that also
will be the signature where the head operator of xσ will be defined after application
of a mgu σ;
5. choice of a linear ordering: One chooses a linear ordering ≺ over the classes of
variables such that x ≺ y implies yσ is not a subterm of xσ;
6. resolution: Each pure equation is solved in its theory Ei. A variable in the other
theory is considered to be a constant. A unifier σ is built from the solutions σ1 and
σ2 of the two systems S5,1 and S5,2.
Each equation introduced in steps 1. and 2. is indexed by the subterm of s (or t) to
which the variable corresponds. This defines a partial ordering ≺l over equations introduced
during steps 1. and 2.
The choice of theory of a class of variables is important: If a variable is chosen in Ej , for
j ∈ {1, 2}, it will be considered as a variable in S5,j , and as a free constant in S5,j′ (j′ 6= j).
Example. Suppose E1 is the free theory f(x, y, z) ≡E1 f(x, y, z) over the signature Σ1 =
{f}, E2 is the ACUN theory, and we want to solve the problem:
y
?
= E1∪E2f(x1 ⊕ y, x2 ⊕ y, x1 ⊕ x2)
The system S1 built after step 1. is, with the indices:











y
?
= f(z1, z2, z3)
z1
?
= x1 ⊕ y (x1 ⊕ y)
z2
?
= x2 ⊕ y (x2 ⊕ y)
z3
?
= x1 ⊕ x2 (x1 ⊕ x2)
The equations are already pure, so we skip step2. We do not identify any variables at step
3. At step 4., we choose y, z1, z2 in the free theory and x1, x2, z3 in the ACUN theory. At
step 5, we choose the linear ordering:
z1 ≺ z2 ≺ z3 ≺ y ≺ x1 ≺ x2
At step 5. we have to solve the systems:
S5,1 =
{
y
?
= f(z1, z2, z3)
S5,2 =





z1
?
= x1 ⊕ y
z2
?
= x2 ⊕ y
z3
?
= x1 ⊕ x2
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with y, z1, z2 (resp. x1, x2, z3) considered as variables in S5,1 (resp. S5,2) and as constants
in S5,2 (resp. S5,1). The most general unifier of S5,i, for i ∈ {1, 2} is σi, with:



σ1 = {y 7→ f(z1, z2, z3)}
σ2 = {x1 7→ z1 ⊕ y, x2 7→ z2 ⊕ y,
z3 7→ z1 ⊕ z2}
A most general unifier of:
y
?
= E1∪E2f(x1 ⊕ y, x2 ⊕ y, x1 ⊕ x2)
is then built inductively over ≺ :
1. z1σ = z1
2. z2σ = z2
3. z3σ = z1 ⊕ z2
4. yσ = f(z1, z2, z1 ⊕ z2)
5. x1σ = z1 ⊕ f(z1, z2, z1 ⊕ z2)
6. x2σ = z2 ⊕ f(z1, z2, z1 ⊕ z2)
We note that, in this example, one has
|Var(sσ) ∪ Var(tσ)| = 2
|Var(s) ∪ Var(t)| = 3
The aim of this section is to prove that, for all equations s
?
= Et over a combination of
the free theory on a non-empty signature Σ1 and of the ACUN theory, and for all unifier σ
found using this procedure, the inequality:
|Var(sσ) ∪ Var(tσ)| < |Var(s) ∪ Var(t)|
holds as soon as σ is not the identity substitution. This is already the case for the free
theory and for the ACUN theory. The main difficulty is to deal with variables introduced
at steps 1. and 2.
13.2 General results
In this subsection, E1 and E2 are two arbitrary theories such that there exists an algorithm
for unification with linear constant restriction in E1 and E2. In the sequel, we assume the
sets of most general unifiers of the unification problem with linear constant restriction S5,j ,
for j ∈ {1, 2}, are not empty, and that σj is one most general solution of S5,j , for j ∈ {1, 2}.
Finally, let us call Xl the set of variables introduced at steps 1. and 2., and X0 the set of
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variables in s or t. After step 3., a substitution σEq : X0 ∪Xl 7→ X0 ∪Xl is applied mapping
each variable to a representant of its equivalence class. Without loss of generality, we assume
xσEq ∈ X0 as soon as there exists a variable from X0 in the equivalence class of x. Based on
this convention, the first lemma does not depend on the theories considered, and is a direct
consequence of the combination algorithm.
Lemma 1 For each variable x ∈ Xl ∩ Var(S5), there exists in S5 an equation x
?
= r where
x /∈ Var(r).
Proof. Let x be such a variable, and consider the set Ωx ⊆ S3 of equations:
x
?
= r
The set Ωx is not empty, since at least one such equation was introduced at the same time
as the represent of the class x. Among the equations in Ωx, suppose x
?
= r is one of minimal
index for ≺l.
Claim. x /∈ Var(r).
Proof. By contradiction, suppose x ∈ Var(r). This implies there exists in S2 a uni-
fication problem y1
?
= r′ and a variable y2 such that y1, y2 are in the equivalence class
of x, and r = r′σEq . By choice of representant in σEq , x /∈ X0 implies y2 6∈ X0. Thus,
there exists in S2 an equation y2
?
= r2. By construction, this equation is of smaller
index (for ≺l) than y1
?
= r′, and thus there exists in Ωx a problem x
?
= r2σEq of smaller
index than x /∈ Var(r). This contradicts the minimality of x
?
= r.
Note that the lemma implies that x 6= r. In the sequel, we transform a system of
equations in order to remove variables introduced at steps 1. and 2. To this end, we note
Π = (P1,P2, δ,≺) a combination problem:
  Pi, for i ∈ {1, 2}, is a set of pure i-unification problems;
  We note Const(Π) = Const(P1) ∪ Const(P2) and Var(Π) = Var1(P1) ∪ Var2(P2);
  δ is a set of couples (x, t) where x ∈ Const(Π) \ Var(Π);
  ≺ is a linear ordering of variables and free constants of Π.
Note that, given a combination problem Π, we can have Const(Π) ∩ Var(Π) 6= ∅. The set
Const(Π) is the subset of variables that are considered as constants either in P1 or P2, and
Var(Π) is the subset of variables that are treated as variables either in P1 or P2. A most
general solution σ of the combination problem Π is obtained by the combination of the
solutions σ1 and σ2 of P1 and P2 using the ordering ≺ over variables and constants.
Our first aim is to remove part of the variables introduced during step 1. and 2. from
the unification problems P1 and P2. The problem is that even if a variable x chosen in
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theory E1 is removed (by partial application of a substitution), it may still appear in P2.
We collect in third argument δ the remplacement that can be done on these variables. By
the inductive construction of σ over ≺ , it is clear that if (x, t) ∈ δ and x /∈ Var(t), then x
will not appear in the expression of the solution σ.
The combination problem produced by the algorithm is initially:
Π0 = (S5,1,S5,2, ∅,≺)
Two sets of combination problems P and P′ are said to be equivalent over X if X ⊆
Var(P) ∩ Var(P′) and there exists a bijection ψ between the most general unifiers of com-
bination problems in P and P′ such that, for all most general solution σ of P, and for all
x ∈ X , we have: xσ = x(ψ(σ)).
Proposition 12 Starting from a combination problem Π0 = (S5,1,S5,2, ∅,≺) with solu-
tions (σ11 , σ
1
2), . . . , (σ
m
1 , σ
m
2 ) of (S5,1,S5,2), one can build a set of combination problems
{
Πj = (Pj1 ,P
j
2 , δ,≺)
}
j∈{1,...,m}
equivalent with {Π0} over X0 such that x ∈ Var(Πj) iff
either x ∈ X0 or:
 xσj1 = xσ
j
2 = x
 and there exists a variable y 6= x such that x ∈ Var(yσjj′ ), for j
′ ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. Let σ be a solution of Π0, S ′5,i be S5,i in solved form for σ, and let:
Ωi =
{
x ∈ Vari(S
′
5,i) ∩ Xl |x
?
= tx ∈ S
′
5,i and tx 6= x
}
Note that the sets Ω1 and Ω2 are disjoint, and let:
{
Sj = ∪x∈Ωj
{
x
?
= tx
}
j ∈ {1, 2}
sj = ∪x∈Ωj (x, tx) j ∈ {1, 2}
The combination problem (S ′5,1 \ S1,S
′
5,2 \ S2, s1 ∪ s2,≺) has one solution equivalent to σ
over X0. The last condition can be ensured by simply removing the equations x
?
= x over
variables x ∈ Xl such that x does not appear in the image of any other variable y.
The Proposition 13 implies that if x ∈ Var(Π)∩Xl, then x was chosen in the free theory:
In S5,2, we can replace every occurrence of a variable in Var2(Xl) by a term t such that
Var2(t)∩Xl = ∅. This last equality ensures the termination of the remplacement procedure.
Let x
?
= t be the unification problem given by Lemma 1. If t is a term over Σ1, x cannot
be a 2-term. Thus, t is a 2-term and it is possible to replace x by t in P2, and add (x, t) to
δ. Thus, it is sufficient to handle the case of x ∈ Xl and x chosen in the free theory E1.
INRIA
Constraint Solving with Xor 33
13.3 Case of the ACUN theory
We investigate in this section the more specific case where E1 is the free theory and E2
is the ACUN theory. Since both E1 and E2 are unitary, Π0 has only one solution σ. Let
Π = (P1,P2, δ,≺) be the combination problem obtained from (S5,1,S5,2, ∅,≺) by application
of Proposition 12. We assume that the variables of P2 are either in X0 or in V = {z1, . . . , zk},
and that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}:
  zi is not equivalent to a variable in X 0;
  ziσ1 = ziσ2 = zi and there exists a variable y 6= zi such that zi ∈ Var(yσj), for
j ∈ {1, 2}.
We note x1, . . . , xn the variables (modulo equivalence) in X0 chosen in the theory 2, and
y1, . . . , yl the variables in X0 chosen in theory 1.
Finally, for zi ∈ V , we note Eqzi = zi
?
= ti the unification problem given by Proposi-
tion 13.
First, let us prove the following lemma that bounds the occurrences of variables in Xl.
Proposition 13 For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, there is an equation zi
?
= ti in S5,2 such that
Var(ti) ∩ {z1, . . . , zk} = ∅.
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider z1, let Eqz1 = z1
?
= t1 the equation given by
Lemma 1, and let z′ ∈ V ∩ Var(t). By Lemma 1, we know that z′ 6= z1 and, since all
the variables in V are different after step 3., we have z ′ 6= t1. Thus, t1 is a non-atomic
term. Since z1σ1 = z1σ2 = z1, t1 must be a 2-term, and thus Eqz1 is in S5,2. Since z
′ ∈ V
implies z′ ∈ Xl, let z′
?
= t′ be the equation introduced at the same time as z′. Since z′ is
a strict subterm of t, it must have been introduced at step 1. Since t is a pure 2-term and
z′ represents an alien subterm, t′ is a 1-term. The fact z′ ∈ Xl implies that t
′ is not in X0,
and thus is a non-atomic term. Since E1 is the free theory, z
′ must be chosen in theory
E1 and is instantiated. This contradicts the fact that z
′ ∈ V by point 2., thus proving the
proposition.
Corollary 1 There are at least k independant equations in S5,2.
Proof. In the ACUN theory, the set of unification problems {Eqz}z∈V can be viewed as
an affine equation system {z + tz = 0}z∈V , whose solution is the affine subspace expressed
by σ2. Let (αi)i∈{1,...,k} be a sequence of coefficients such that:
Σki=1αizi = Σ
k
i=1αiti
The zi do not appear on the right-hand side by Proposition 13. Thus, both members of
this equation are null. This implies that Σki=1αi · zi = 0. Since the zi are different one from
another, the sum is zero if, and only if, all the factors αi are null. This implies that the pure
equations Eqzi are linearly independant one from another.
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The relation between the rank of the system and the number of variables in V given by
Corollary 1 permits to bound the number of variables in V .
Proposition 14 We have:
|Var2(X0σ2)| + k ≤ |X0|
and if equality holds, then either k ≥ 1 or σ2 = Id.
Proof. First, let us consider the case k = 0. If all equations in S5,2 are trivially satisfiable
(σ2 = Id), the results holds. Else, let m be the number of lineary independant equations.
The affine solution space (and hence σ2) is of dimension n−m, and thus σ2 is parameterized
by n−m < n variables. Then again, the proposition holds.
Let us now consider the general case k ≥ 1. Suppose there are p equations in S5,2.
Finding the (unique) most general unifier σ2 amounts to solving an affine system:
M ·X = N · Y + P · Z
where:
X =



x1
...
xn



Y =



y1
...
yl



Z =



z1
...
zk



and M (resp. N , resp. P ) is a p × n (resp. p × l, resp. p × k) matrix over the field    2    
.
Using gaussian elimination, there exists two invertible matrices A (of dimension p× p) and
B (of dimension n× n) such that:
A.M.B = D =








1
0
1
0
0
0








Let us note X ′ = B.X , N ′ = A.N and P ′ = A.P . The system above is equivalent to:
D.X ′ = N ′.Y + P ′.Z
Claim. The p−m bottom lines of P ′ and N ′ are null.
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Proof. The choices on variables imply that:
  every variables v, v′ ∈ {y1, . . . , yl, z1, . . . , zk} are distinct, by choice of equivalence
classes over variables at the third step;
  no variable v ∈ {y1, . . . , yl, z1, . . . , zk} is a linear combination of other variables,
by the first point and by the fact that, for a solution σ2 of this system, we have
vσ2 = v.
It follows that every linear combination:
Σli=1αiyi + Σ
k
j=1βjzj
is null iff all the αi, βj are null. The shape of D and the existence of a solution permit
to conclude.
Thus, the matrices M ′, N ′ and P ′ are at most of rank m. From A invertible, it follows
that the matrices M , N and P are also at most of rank m. This implies that there are at
most m linearly independant equations in S5,2. Thus, Corollary 1 implies k ≤ m.
The solution of the homogen system M.X = 0 is parameterized by n−m variables, hence
there are at most n variables in the expression of a general solution σ of the system. The
desired result is obtained after adding the l constants yj .
Theorem 1 Let s
?
= t be a unification problem modulo E1 ∪E2, and let σ be a most general
solution of this problem. Then either σ = Id or:
|Var(sσ) ∪ Var(tσ)| < |Var(s) ∪ Var(t)|
Proof. Let l = |X 0 ∩ Var1(X0σ1)|, k = |X l ∩ Var1(X0σ1)|, m = |Var2(X0σ2)| and n =
|Var2(X0)|. By Proposition 14, k +m ≤ n and if equality holds, then either σ1 is not the
identity or σ2 is the identity. A property of the free theory is that l ≤ |X0| − n, and if
equality holds, then σ1 = Id. Thus, if either σ1 or σ2 is not the identity, one among the two
above equality is strict, and by summing them, we obtain:
k + l +m < |X0|
RR n
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